Illinois · State Restrictive-Covenant Law

Is your Illinois employment contract worth signing?

I draft and review the restrictive covenants inside Illinois employment agreements, non-competes and non-solicits, against the Freedom to Work Act, and I send attorney demand letters when a covenant is overreaching or being misused. Plain-English contract drafting and review, plus attorney demand letters, from one California attorney.

✓ Measured against 820 ILCS 90 ✓ Earnings-threshold check ✓ 14-day notice review ✓ CA Bar #279869
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Sergei Tokmakov, Esq. | California Bar #279869

🤖 AI Legal Analyst

Describe your situation

Tell me about the Illinois non-compete or non-solicit you signed or want to use, and I will give you a straight read on where it likely stands under the Freedom to Work Act: the earnings floor, whether the consideration looks adequate, and whether the 14-day notice steps were followed. AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. A full review of your document is the $240 Written Attorney Consultation, not this chat.

Common questions, answered here
Does Illinois enforce non-competes at all?
Sometimes. A non-compete is void unless the employee's annualized earnings exceed $75,000 (820 ILCS 90/10), the covenant rests on adequate consideration and protects a legitimate business interest (820 ILCS 90/15), and the employer gave the written consult-counsel advice plus a 14-day review (820 ILCS 90/20). Miss any of those and it is void.
What are the current earnings thresholds?
Non-compete: earnings must exceed $75,000 per year. Non-solicit: earnings must exceed $45,000 per year (820 ILCS 90/10). Both rise on a schedule starting January 1, 2027. These figures are current through 2026; confirm the current statute before relying on them.
Who pays attorney fees if there is a fight?
If the employee prevails in an action or arbitration the employer brought to enforce the covenant, the employee recovers all costs and reasonable attorney fees from the employer (820 ILCS 90/25). The shifting runs only one way, in the employee's favor.

The short answer on Illinois restrictive covenants

Illinois enforces non-competes and non-solicits, but only inside tight statutory rails. Under the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, a non-compete is illegal and void unless the employee's actual or expected annualized earnings exceed $75,000 per year, and a non-solicit is void unless earnings exceed $45,000 per year 820 ILCS 90/10. Even above those floors, the covenant must rest on adequate consideration, be no broader than needed to protect a legitimate business interest 820 ILCS 90/15, and follow the written advice-to-consult-counsel and 14-day review steps 820 ILCS 90/20. Get any of that wrong and the covenant is void, and if the employer sues to enforce a covenant the employee defeats, the employer pays the employee's costs and reasonable attorney fees 820 ILCS 90/25.

Verified against the Illinois General Assembly text; confirm the current statute before relying on it. The earnings thresholds escalate on January 1, 2027, and again in 2032 and 2037, so a figure that is correct today can go stale.

Practical bottom line: in Illinois, a non-compete or non-solicit is the exception that has to earn its enforceability, not the default. Whether you are signing one or trying to enforce one, the first questions are earnings level, consideration, the 14-day steps, and how narrowly the covenant is written.

The current Illinois framework was enacted by Public Act 102-358, effective January 1, 2022 820 ILCS 90/15 (Source: P.A. 102-358, eff. 1-1-22). Here is what each operative section does.

Earnings thresholds (820 ILCS 90/10)

A non-compete is illegal and void unless the employee's actual or expected annualized rate of earnings exceeds $75,000 per year. A non-solicit, soliciting the employer's employees, or soliciting its clients or vendors for the sale of products or services, is illegal and void unless earnings exceed $45,000 per year, a separate and lower floor 820 ILCS 90/10. Both floors step up over time:

Effective date Non-compete floor Non-solicit floor
Now (through 2026)$75,000$45,000
Jan 1, 2027$80,000$47,500
Jan 1, 2032$85,000$50,000
Jan 1, 2037$90,000$52,500

"Earnings" is defined broadly: compensation including earned salary, earned bonuses, earned commissions, or any other form of taxable compensation reflected or expected to be reflected as wages, tips, and other compensation on the employee's IRS Form W-2 820 ILCS 90/5 (definition of "earnings"). That definition is how the $75,000 and $45,000 floors are measured.

The Act surfaces sector-specific carve-outs (for example for certain construction workers and certain mental-health professionals) in 820 ILCS 90/10. I have not quoted those exclusion details here. If you think a carve-out might apply to your role, that is general information, confirm the current text of the exemption before relying on it.

Adequate consideration (820 ILCS 90/5)

The Act defines "adequate consideration" as either (1) the employee worked for the employer for at least two years after signing the agreement containing the covenant, or (2) the employer otherwise provided consideration adequate to support the covenant, which can be a period of employment plus additional professional or financial benefits, or merely professional or financial benefits that are adequate on their own 820 ILCS 90/5. The two-year figure is a statutory definition here, not only case law.

The Fifield wrinkle. Before the 2022 codification, Illinois case law (Fifield v. Premier Dealer Services, 2013 IL App (1st) 120327) drew a bright line: absent other consideration, a restrictive covenant needed at least two years of continued employment, even where the employee resigned voluntarily first. That rule is contested. The Illinois Supreme Court has not ruled on it, and federal judges in the Northern District of Illinois have split, some rejecting the bright line for a fact-specific analysis. Whether Fifield still controls after the statute codified an "adequate consideration" definition is unsettled, so I treat short-tenure covenants as a risk area, not a safe harbor.

Legitimate business interest and reasonableness (820 ILCS 90/15)

A non-compete or non-solicit is illegal and void unless, among other conditions, the employee receives adequate consideration and the covenant is no greater than required to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer 820 ILCS 90/15. Overbroad scope, geography, or duration is not just bad drafting; it can void the covenant.

The 14-day review and consult-counsel rule (820 ILCS 90/20)

For the covenant to be enforceable, the employer must do both: (1) advise the employee in writing to consult an attorney before entering the covenant, and (2) give the employee a copy of the covenant at least 14 calendar days before employment starts, or give the employee at least 14 calendar days to review it 820 ILCS 90/20. Both conditions must be satisfied. A rushed day-one signature with no written advice to consult counsel is a classic, avoidable defect.

One-way fee-shifting (820 ILCS 90/25)

If an employee prevails in a civil action or arbitration that an employer filed to enforce a non-compete or non-solicit, the employee recovers from the employer all costs and all reasonable attorney fees 820 ILCS 90/25. The shifting runs only in the employee's favor; there is no mirror-image recovery for an employer who wins.

Why this changes the math. An employer who sues on a weak or non-compliant covenant is not just risking a loss; it is risking paying the worker's legal bill on top of its own. That asymmetry is real leverage for a worker, and a real deterrent for an employer with a shaky covenant. I do not quote the precise statutory sentence of 90/25 in quotation marks here; the operative effect is stated above, and the exact wording should be pulled from the ilga.gov section text before any verbatim quotation in a filing.

One open point: whether the current thresholds and procedures apply only to covenants entered into on or after January 1, 2022. The effective date of P.A. 102-358 is confirmed, but the precise applicability and non-retroactivity language was not separately verified here. If your covenant predates 2022, that is general information, confirm the applicability provision before assuming prior law or the current thresholds control.

Clearing the statutory gates is necessary but not sufficient. Once the earnings floor, consideration, and 14-day steps are met, an Illinois court still asks whether the covenant is reasonable: is it no broader than needed to protect a legitimate business interest, and is its scope, geography, and duration proportionate to that interest 820 ILCS 90/15?

Factors that help a non-compete survive

  • A genuine protectable interest. Real trade secrets, confidential information, or near-permanent customer relationships, not just a general wish to suppress competition.
  • Narrow scope. Limited to the actual line of business, the actual territory the employee served, and a duration tied to how long the protected information stays valuable.
  • Clean process. Earnings above the floor, documented adequate consideration, written advice to consult counsel, and a real 14-day review window.

Reformation and blue-penciling

Illinois courts have, in the right circumstances, modified or "blue-penciled" overbroad covenants rather than void them outright, but this is discretionary, not automatic, and a court is not obligated to rewrite a covenant the drafter made unreasonably broad. This is general guidance on the reformation posture; the safer drafting assumption is that a court will not rescue an overreaching clause, so the covenant should be drawn narrowly from the start. Confirm the current reformation standard before relying on a court to save an aggressive clause.

Drafting to the edge and hoping a judge trims it back is a poor strategy in Illinois, because an overbroad covenant can be voided, and if the employer sues and loses, the fee-shifting in 820 ILCS 90/25 puts the employer on the hook for the worker's fees.

A covenant not to solicit, soliciting the employer's employees, or soliciting its clients or vendors for the sale of products or services, is illegal and void unless the employee's earnings exceed $45,000 per year, a separate and lower floor than the $75,000 non-compete threshold 820 ILCS 90/10. That gap matters: a worker can be paid too little for a non-compete to bind, yet enough for a non-solicit to apply.

A non-solicit still has to clear the same consideration, legitimate-interest, and 14-day requirements as a non-compete 820 ILCS 90/15, 820 ILCS 90/20, and the same one-way fee-shifting if the employer sues and loses 820 ILCS 90/25.

For many employers, a well-drawn non-solicit plus strong confidentiality terms protects the real asset, the customer relationships and the proprietary information, with far less enforceability risk than a broad non-compete. I often steer employers toward that structure when the goal is protecting relationships, not locking a worker out of the market.

Here is how I approach an Illinois restrictive covenant, whether I am drafting one for an employer or reviewing one a worker was handed.

The drafting and review checklist I run

  • Earnings gate first. Confirm the worker's actual or expected annualized earnings clear the right floor ($75,000 for a non-compete, $45,000 for a non-solicit) 820 ILCS 90/10. Below the floor, the covenant is void no matter how it reads.
  • Document the consideration. Either build in the two-year runway or provide identifiable professional or financial benefits, and say so in the agreement 820 ILCS 90/5.
  • Honor the 14-day process. Written advice to consult counsel, plus a real 14-day review window, with the dates documented 820 ILCS 90/20.
  • Narrow it to the interest. Tie scope, geography, and duration to the legitimate business interest, and prefer a non-solicit plus confidentiality over a broad non-compete where that protects the real asset 820 ILCS 90/15.

The multistate choice-of-law trap

A clause that says the contract is "governed by the law of another state" is not a reliable way to dodge the Freedom to Work Act for an employee who lives and works in Illinois. Many states, Illinois among them, scrutinize choice-of-law clauses that try to evade a strong local public policy on restrictive covenants, and the Act reflects a clear Illinois public policy. Treat a foreign choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause as a fight to be had, not a settled answer. This is general guidance on the choice-of-law posture; the analysis is fact-specific, so confirm how a court is likely to treat the clause for your particular facts before relying on it.

If your agreement picks another state's law or a non-Illinois forum, that is exactly the kind of provision I look at closely. It can change who has leverage, and it does not automatically defeat Illinois protections for an Illinois worker.

Employer checklist before you ask anyone to sign

  • Confirm the earnings floor. Is the worker's actual or expected annualized earnings above $75,000 for a non-compete, or above $45,000 for a non-solicit 820 ILCS 90/10? If not, do not rely on the covenant.
  • Build in real consideration. Plan for the two-year runway or identifiable professional or financial benefits, and document it 820 ILCS 90/5.
  • Give the written notice and 14 days. Advise the worker in writing to consult counsel and give at least 14 calendar days to review 820 ILCS 90/20. Document the dates.
  • Keep it narrow. Match scope, geography, and duration to a real legitimate business interest 820 ILCS 90/15; consider a non-solicit plus confidentiality instead of a broad non-compete.
  • Weigh the downside of suing. If you enforce and lose, you may owe the worker's costs and reasonable attorney fees 820 ILCS 90/25.

Worker checklist before you sign, or if you are being threatened

  • Check your earnings level. If your annualized earnings do not exceed $75,000, a non-compete is likely void; under $45,000, a non-solicit is likely void too 820 ILCS 90/10.
  • Look at how it was presented. Were you advised in writing to consult an attorney, and given at least 14 days to review 820 ILCS 90/20? A rushed day-one signature can be a defect.
  • Ask what you got for it. Was there adequate consideration, two years of employment or real professional or financial benefits 820 ILCS 90/5?
  • Test the breadth. Is the covenant far broader than any real interest the employer has 820 ILCS 90/15? Overbreadth can void it.
  • Know your fee leverage. If the employer sues to enforce and you prevail, you can recover your costs and reasonable attorney fees 820 ILCS 90/25.

California: near-total ban

California voids most employee non-competes outright as a matter of policy. It is the strict end of the spectrum, well beyond Illinois's threshold-based approach.

New York: common-law reasonableness

New York leans on a judge-made reasonableness test rather than a statutory earnings floor. General information; confirm the current New York rule before relying on it.

Texas: enforceable if reasonable

Texas generally enforces non-competes that are reasonable in scope and tied to otherwise-enforceable consideration. General information; confirm the current Texas rule before relying on it.

Federal: no ban in effect

The FTC's 2024 Non-Compete Clause Rule was set aside nationwide on August 20, 2024 in Ryan, LLC v. FTC and never took effect; in September 2025 the FTC formally abandoned it and acceded to its vacatur FTC Press Release, Sept. 5, 2025. State law governs.

Want the multistate map and the other state leaves? Start at the Employment Agreements Hub state index.

If you received one of my demand letters and are deciding whether I follow through, here is the straight answer: I do not stop at the letter. A demand letter and the Pre-Litigation Negotiation Phase are the pre-litigation steps. When a demand is ignored or no settlement is reached, I escalate, and filing a complaint, initiating arbitration, and appearing as counsel of record is a real capability, not a bluff.

Scope, stated plainly. The demand letter and the $1,500 Pre-Litigation Negotiation Phase are pre-litigation. Filing a complaint, initiating arbitration, and appearing as counsel of record are a separate, separately-quoted engagement, California only. I file complaints and represent clients in California when the matter calls for it; that is a separate engagement, not an automatic next step in every case, and not a free add-on. The California-only caveat is real.

Who hires me on Illinois restrictive covenants

Pricing and how the matter can escalate

Flat-fee work, with a clear pre-litigation to litigation path. I draft and review Illinois restrictive covenants, and when one is being misused I send an attorney demand letter and, where the matter calls for it and the client is in California, escalate to filing or arbitration as a separate engagement.

Written Attorney Consultation

$240

A written attorney read on your covenant: the main issues, the risks, the leverage points, and the practical next step. The right starting point when you want my eyes on the document.

Attorney Demand Letter

$575

When a covenant is being misused, an attorney letter on firm letterhead, with review of the other side's first substantive response and a narrow counter-response if strategically appropriate.

Other tiers as the matter grows: the $400 1-Hour Zoom Strategy Session for live strategy, the $1,200 Litigation-Leverage Demand Package when a court-ready draft complaint or arbitration demand should be attached as leverage, and the $1,500 Pre-Litigation Negotiation Phase for multi-round negotiation. Filing a complaint, initiating arbitration, or appearing as counsel of record is a separate, separately-quoted engagement, California only. Hourly overflow on existing work is $240 per hour.

Does Illinois enforce non-compete agreements?

Sometimes, but Illinois is restrictive. A non-compete is illegal and void unless the employee's actual or expected annualized earnings exceed $75,000 per year (820 ILCS 90/10), and that floor rises to $80,000 on January 1, 2027, $85,000 on January 1, 2032, and $90,000 on January 1, 2037. Even above the floor, the covenant must rest on adequate consideration and be no broader than needed to protect a legitimate business interest (820 ILCS 90/15), and the employer must give the required written notice and 14-day review (820 ILCS 90/20). If those conditions are not met, the covenant is void.

What is the earnings threshold for a non-solicitation covenant in Illinois?

A covenant not to solicit the employer's employees, clients, or vendors is illegal and void unless the employee's actual or expected annualized earnings exceed $45,000 per year (820 ILCS 90/10). That is a separate, lower floor than the $75,000 non-compete threshold, and it rises to $47,500 on January 1, 2027, $50,000 on January 1, 2032, and $52,500 on January 1, 2037. So a worker can be too low-paid for a non-compete to bind but high-paid enough that a non-solicit can.

What counts as adequate consideration for an Illinois restrictive covenant?

The Freedom to Work Act defines adequate consideration as either (1) the employee worked for the employer for at least two years after signing, or (2) the employer otherwise provided consideration adequate to support the covenant, which can be a period of employment plus additional professional or financial benefits, or professional or financial benefits adequate on their own (820 ILCS 90/5). The two-year figure is now a statutory definition, not only case law. Separately, the older Fifield line of cases treated two years of continued employment as the bright-line minimum absent other consideration; whether that gloss still controls after the 2022 codification is contested and unsettled, so I treat short-tenure covenants as a risk area, not a safe bet.

What is the 14-day review rule in Illinois?

For a non-compete or non-solicit to be enforceable, the employer must both (1) advise the employee in writing to consult an attorney before entering the covenant, and (2) give the employee a copy of the covenant at least 14 calendar days before employment begins, or give the employee at least 14 calendar days to review it (820 ILCS 90/20). Both conditions must be met. Skipping the written advice-to-consult-counsel step or rushing the signature inside the 14-day window is a common, avoidable enforceability defect.

Who pays attorney fees if a non-compete fight goes to court in Illinois?

The Freedom to Work Act has a one-way fee-shifting remedy. If an employee prevails in a civil action or arbitration that the employer filed to enforce a non-compete or non-solicit, the employee recovers all costs and all reasonable attorney fees from the employer (820 ILCS 90/25). The shifting runs only in the employee's favor, so an employer who sues on a weak or non-compliant covenant risks paying the worker's legal bill. There is no mirror-image recovery for the employer.

Is there still a federal ban on non-competes?

No. The FTC's 2024 Non-Compete Clause Rule, which would have banned most post-employment non-competes nationwide, was set aside on a nationwide basis on August 20, 2024 in Ryan, LLC v. FTC, and the rule never took effect. In September 2025 the FTC formally abandoned the rule and acceded to its vacatur (FTC Press Release, Sept. 5, 2025), so enforcement reverts to case-by-case action. There is no federal ban, which means state law, here the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, governs.

This page is informational and is not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Illinois statutory provisions are summarized from the Illinois General Assembly text and were current when written; statutes and case law change, and the earnings thresholds escalate over time, so confirm the current statute before relying on anything here. Sergei Tokmakov, Esq., California Bar #279869. I am licensed in California; filing a complaint, initiating arbitration, or appearing as counsel of record is a separate engagement and is California only.