Default Search After the Google Remedies Decision 🔍⚖️
One-year contracts, AI apps, and what the new rules really change (and don’t)
The remedies decision in United States v. Google has finally landed, and it does something very concrete:
Default search and AI-app distribution deals tied to Google’s payments are now capped at one year and cannot be exclusive. (Department of Justice)
No forced breakup of Chrome. No divestiture of Android. Instead, the court opted for a behavioral remedy package that rewires how Google can pay to be the default on browsers, phones, and emerging AI assistants.
This isn’t just about search. The order explicitly reaches Google Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, and the Gemini app, and is wrapped in a broader framework of:
- limits on exclusivity and contract duration,
- mandated data sharing and syndication to “Qualified Competitors,” and
- six years of oversight by a technical committee. (Department of Justice)
For anyone drafting distribution deals, OEM contracts, or AI integration agreements, the real story is how this shifts the default-competition game for the next decade.
What the court actually ordered 🧩
You can think of the remedies as three pillars:
- Behavioral limits on deals for defaults
- Data and syndication access for rivals
- Oversight and transparency
Here’s a condensed view.
Core remedies at a glance
| Remedy block ⚙️ | What it does in practice | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|
| No exclusives on key access points đźš« | Bars Google from entering or maintaining exclusive contracts for the distribution of Google Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, and Gemini. | DOJ press release & remedies decision summary (Department of Justice) |
| One-year cap on paid default deals ⏱️ | Google may still pay for default placement, but only if agreements are non-exclusive and have a term of one year or less. | CRS Legal Sidebar summarizing the remedies opinion (Congress.gov) |
| Data-sharing to “Qualified Competitors” 📊 | Requires Google to make defined search-index and user-interaction (“click-and-query”) data available to certain rivals meeting “Qualified Competitor” criteria. | CRS summary of data-sharing section (Congress.gov) |
| Syndication of search & ad results 🔄 | Obligates Google to syndicate search results and general search text ads to Qualified Competitors under time-limited licenses to help them get off the ground. | CRS summary of syndication remedies (Congress.gov) |
| Technical committee + six-year term 🛠️ | Establishes a technical committee (engineering, AI, privacy) to monitor compliance; final judgment term is six years. | CRS overview of implementation & oversight (Congress.gov) |
The headline for product counsel: Google can still buy defaults—but only in one-year, non-exclusive tranches, under a microscope.
How default search and AI deals change now 📱🤖
From multi-year lockups to annual auctions
Pre-remedy, Google’s default deals with OEMs, carriers, and browsers were often multi-year arrangements, with powerful economic incentives not to touch rivals. The remedies judgment:
- bans exclusive distribution contracts for Google Search, Chrome, Assistant, and Gemini; and
- allows payment for default placement only where the contract term is one year or less. (Department of Justice)
That means:
- Apple, Samsung, carriers, and browser vendors can still take Google’s money,
- but they must revisit those deals every year, and
- they are explicitly free to distribute and promote rival search engines and AI assistants in parallel.
The court consciously rejected a total payment ban, on the ground that cutting off those revenue streams could hurt smaller browser developers and device makers that rely on them. (Congress.gov)
AI assistants and Gemini are pulled into the same framework
The remedies don’t just talk about classic “general search engines.” The same contractual rules apply to:
- Google Assistant (voice assistant), and
- the Gemini app (GenAI product). (Department of Justice)
So the “default” competition is no longer just:
Google Search vs. other web search engines,
but also:
Google Assistant / Gemini vs. third-party AI assistants and chat-based search products.
In practice:
- OEMs and carriers can negotiate parallel defaults (e.g., one search box, multiple clearly presented choices over time).
- Annual term + no exclusivity gives rival search and AI providers at least procedural access to bid each year.
Whether they can match Google’s checkbook is a separate, more economic question.
Data and syndication: turning Google’s scale into a utility pipe 🧵
The court didn’t just tweak contract terms; it also ordered structured access to some of the scale advantages Google accumulated while violating antitrust law.
Search-index and click-and-query data đź“š
The remedies decision requires Google to share with “Qualified Competitors” certain:
- search-index data (a slice of the web index), and
- user-interaction data (which links users click, hover time, etc.). (Congress.gov)
The court’s logic:
- that data is the “raw material” Google used to improve search quality,
- some of it is a direct “fruit” of the unlawful exclusivity, and
- mandated sharing is a reasonable way to un-freeze competition.
This is not an all-you-can-eat API; there are defined categories, thresholds, and security requirements. But it’s the first time a court has ordered a search monopolist to turn key data assets into something like regulated inputs for rivals.
Syndication as a ramp for new search & AI entrants 🛫
On top of data sharing, Google must syndicate:
- search results (SERP content), and
- general search text ads
to Qualified Competitors on five-year licenses with caps (for example, a percentage cap on the share of queries that can be served through Google’s syndication). (Congress.gov)
The idea is straightforward:
- New or smaller players can bootstrap their product using Google results and ads while they build their own index and ads infrastructure.
- Over time, caps on query share and license duration push them to wean off and become independent.
From a drafting standpoint, this is going to look like:
- a new category of court-mandated commercial agreements,
- with “ordinary commercial terms” shaped by the judgment and technical committee oversight.
What this means for OEMs, browsers, and AI startups 📱🧑‍💻
Let’s map how different players are affected.
Impact by stakeholder
| Who 🧑‍💼 | Upside ✅ | New constraints / risks ⚠️ |
|---|---|---|
| OEMs & carriers (phones, tablets, etc.) | Continued ability to take Google’s money for default placement; yearly opportunity to invite other bidders; leverage in negotiations (“we can walk in 12 months”). | Must treat defaults as non-exclusive and limited to ≤ 1 year when tied to Google payments; under scrutiny if they effectively recreate exclusivity in practice. (Department of Justice) |
| Browser vendors (including smaller players) | Ongoing default revenue from Google; formal affirmation that they can promote alternative engines and AI tools without breaching Google deals. | Need to manage more complex default UX (choice, rotation) and ensure contracts do not drift toward de facto exclusivity. |
| Search / AI startups | Potential access to index & click-and-query data and syndication, plus a seat at the table in annual default bid cycles. | Must qualify as “Qualified Competitors”; must comply with technical, security, and usage caps; still face Google’s financial scale. (Congress.gov) |
| Large platforms integrating search/AI | Clearer path to negotiate multi-source setups (e.g., one provider now, another next year) knowing Google’s contracts cannot lock up defaults for 3–5 years. | Need to align own contracts with the spirit of the judgment; over-reliance on a single default partner could look suspect in future cases. |
The remedies do not guarantee that a rival search or AI player will suddenly displace Google as the default. What they do is reset the bargaining environment so that:
- time (1-year terms) and
- structure (non-exclusivity, mandated access)
work against indefinite lock-up.
How to draft default deals in the post-remedy world 📜✍️
If you’re papering distribution or integration agreements that touch search or AI, the judgment offers a ready-made issue-spotting checklist—even for deals that don’t directly involve Google.
Contract clauses to re-examine
- Term and renewal structure
- Default placement tied to payments should live in one-year terms, with any renewal framed as optional and non-automatic.
- Multi-year commercial relationships can still exist, but the default-related obligations need explicit annual re-openers.
- Exclusivity language
- Avoid any clause that prohibits, discourages, or penalizes distribution or promotion of rival search or AI products.
- Watch out for indirect exclusivity: revenue-share ladders, MFNs, or bonus pools that only make economic sense if the partner stays exclusive.
- Definition of “search access points” and “AI entry points”
- Be explicit about what is covered (address bar, home-screen search widget, voice assistant trigger phrase, system-wide AI key, etc.).
- The remedies decision is very focused on how users actually reach search and AI—contracts should map that reality.
- Data and telemetry rights
- Align data-sharing and usage rights with the possibility that regulators or courts may later mandate access to certain data (as they now have with Google).
- Avoid “lock-up” of data that looks like a smaller version of the scale advantage the Google decision is now trying to unwind.
A mental model for “safe” defaults đź§
You can think of a safer default arrangement as having three properties:
- Short – default commitments are measured in months/one year, not product cycles.
- Plural – the same device or app can readily present or rotate multiple search/AI options over time.
- Transparent – the economic logic (payments, revenue share) and UX (labels, choice) are clear enough to explain in a declaration without squirming.
If you would not want to describe the deal’s effect on rivals in a remedies hearing, it’s a candidate for redrafting.
What this does not do 🪫
It’s important to be clear on the limits of the decision:
- No structural breakup. The court explicitly declined to order divestitures (Chrome, Android), rejecting structural relief in favor of behavioral measures. (Congress.gov)
- No total ban on payments for defaults. Google can still pay very substantial sums for default status; the court rejected a broad payment ban to avoid collateral harm to distribution partners. (Congress.gov)
- No full unbundling of Google’s products. The remedies target contracts and data, not wholesale separation of search, browser, OS, and AI stacks.
Think of it as a controlled unfreezing of the search/AI access layer, not a complete reset of the tech stack.
Frequently asked questions âť“
Can a smaller search or AI company force Google or OEMs to deal with it under this judgment?
Not exactly. The judgment:
- creates the category of “Qualified Competitors” eligible for certain data-sharing and syndication rights, and
- requires Google to make defined data and syndication services available to those Qualified Competitors on specified terms. (Congress.gov)
But it does not give every self-described “search startup” an automatic right to:
- a default slot on major devices, or
- unrestricted access to Google’s index or ads.
Instead, expect a gatekeeping process:
- the technical committee and enforcement agencies will play a role in identifying or vetting Qualified Competitors;
- those competitors will still need to negotiate commercial details within the court’s framework;
- OEMs and browsers retain discretion about which providers they feature, subject to the one-year, non-exclusive rules.
So the judgment opens doors, but it doesn’t turn Google or OEMs into common carriers.
How should non-Google platforms apply this logic to their own defaults to stay ahead of regulators?
Even if you’re not Google, regulators and private plaintiffs now have a live blueprint for attacking default-driven dominance:
- Shorten and de-weaponize your own default terms.
- If you have market power in any vertical, consider voluntarily adopting one-year, non-exclusive terms for default placements and major integration points.
- Document pro-competitive justifications.
- If you insist on longer terms or tighter integration in some contexts, build a contemporaneous record showing why they are necessary for quality, security, or investment, not just foreclosure.
- Avoid “monoculture” access points.
- Where feasible, offer choice screens, multiple preinstalled options, or easy switching, especially in sensitive functions like search, payments, or AI assistants.
- Assume a technical committee could be in your future.
- Design internal governance (documentation, APIs, change logs) so that if a court ever imposes oversight, you’re not scrambling to retrofit transparency.
This remedies package is, effectively, the new default playbook for how courts may try to fix access-point monopolies without breakups. It’s worth aligning with that logic before you find yourself reading about your own product in a Legal Sidebar.